A crude sketch of the Confederate positions at Dole’s Salient by a member of Co. I of the 5th Maine.
Note the regiment was the left most regiment in the first rank during Upton’s charge. There are certainly minor discrepancies but certainly nothing too glaring. Obviously on the 10th they didn’t know about the “Bloody Angle” but good stuff nevertheless.
sketch of Dole’s Salient fight.
“The chief cause of the capture of the division was the absence of the artillery from the line, the removal of which was ordered and carried out on the afternoon of May 11th.” (1)
View from the apex of the salient.
Written years later this was Colonel Thomas H. Carter’s explanation for the disaster that befell Edward Johnson’s division within the Mule Shoe. He would continue “It was withdrawn the afternoon of May 11th by order of General Long, chief of artillery, second corps (Ewell’s), who was doubtless acting under orders, and who said the cavalry had reported the renewal of the flank movement toward Richmond by the enemy”.
So there we have it. Colonel Carter had been the second ranking officer in the corps artillery. As such he was assigned direct command of the artillery along the Mule Shoe line. If anyone outside the uppermost level of the Corps would know the facts it would have been him. He, like many Confederates writings on Spotsylvania in the period of from 1890 to 1910 agree on the cause for the disaster.
So was the Colonel, and the many others who shared his opinions about the withdrawal of the artillery that afternoon, correct? After all General Robert E. Lee, only days after the event called it “one of his blunders”. (2) Was the plan to actually to move or to prepare to move the army that night? And if was to move where to? To answer that question we don’t begin at nightfall on May 11th. Rather we begin at about 8:15 PM on May 10th.
Google Earth of the Mule Shoe
Before we look at that however some boundaries need to be established. The first, and perhaps the most obvious, is that the armies would inevitably move from Spotsylvania Court House. Despite Grant’s well-known comments about fighting it out “on this line if it takes all summer”, the armies would inevitably move on. It was merely a question of which side moved first, in what direction and when. Secondly, this post is limited to the Second Corps units in the Mule Shoe. Both Alexander, commanding the First Corps artillery, and Walker the Third, were given orders to prepare for a move. Of course all the corps commanders would have received similar orders. But again we are only concerned with the Second Corps, and so we take up the story.
When Federal Colonel Emory Upton’s troops fell back to their start line the night of the 10th the Confederates were happy to see them go. Despite their entrenchments, the Federals had quickly punched a hole several hundred yards wide in the defenses as well as almost reaching the McCoull House, Edward Johnsons headquarters. While the Confederates had moved quickly, General Lee himself ordering replacement gunners for a battery forward, to seal the breach and drive the attackers out, they realized they had been lucky. Only the inability of the Federals to reinforce the success had prevented major damage.
From in front of the works up the slope to Dole’s Salient.
The weakness of the line had been apparent to Gen. Robert E. Lee almost as soon as it had been created. On May 9, he had said that it was a miserably weak line, and did not see how it could be held. Now only a day later his fears about the weakness of the position had been validated. Even so the ease with which his defenses had been ruptured had to be a surprise. It was apparent that corrective action needed to be taken immediately, before the Federals could resume the attack. As soon as the battle ended he sent orders to Gen. Ewell directing specific actions correct weaknesses and to prepare for a renewed attack. So concerned was Gen. Lee that he personally visited the area of Doles Salient early the next day. Perhaps this was another indication of his mistrust not only of the line that Ewell held, but Ewell himself.
Throughout the following day the Confederates worked to prevent a repetition of Upton’s success. Not just shoveling more dirt onto the earthworks, but more effectively coordinating the defenses. This process would continue throughout the day and well into the night. At the same time there was a vigorous discussion among the leaders, at all levels, as to whether to hold or abandon the salient.
Topo of Mule Shoe showing lines and McCoull Lane
The portion of the line where Rodes’ and Johnson’s division joined was obviously a weak point. Why? Because of the proximity of the enemy and the dead ground out in front. This had been recognized, the morning after the troops had first occupied the position. Another major weakness was the total absence of artillery coverage, from either flank, of the ground in front of the works from the apex of Dole’s salient to the West Angle about 400 yards northward. Because of this Gen. Rodes had a second line built about 100 yards behind the main line. This second line ran perpendicularly from the main line near the right of Daniels Brigade. About one hundred yards back it turned sharply and ran across the field northward to approximately the extreme right of Doles Brigade. It appears that Johnson’s men had not taken similar precautions by extending the line behind the Stonewall Brigade. The line just ending midway across the field. During the afternoon of the 11th this was corrected, to some extent, by the Stonewall Brigade digging a line of rifle pits extending the line across the field and beyond the McCoull lane. Its ended approximately at the right flank of the Brigade. For some reason the line was not extended by either of the remaining brigades. Several theories exist as to why this was not done. One, and the most likely is that the right of Johnson’s line had not been attacked so it wasn’t considered necessary. . Another is that to do so while Carter’s guns were being withdrawn would have been difficult. Regardless for what ever reason it was not done. However the fact that there was no return or effort to tie the extended line into the main line along Johnson’s front seems to indicate that extending it was contemplated. (3) Finally, there was no need for it. It would be unnecessary, a waste of effort, if the troops were leaving.
Dole’s Brigade, which had taken major casualties the previous evening, definitely needed replacing by fresh troops.First, Pegram’s Brigade of Gordon’s division moved in about dawn on the 11th and occupied their trenches. But they were quickly replaced (4) by the Louisiana Brigade of Brigadier General Harry Hays of Johnson’s division. (5) Hayes men, along with the survivors of Brig. Gen. Leroy Stafford, had been occupying part of the line between the East and West Angles. That section of the line had been quiet, the only effort against it being Mott’s abortive attack the preceding afternoon. It is interesting that although Hayes commanding the combined Louisiana brigades, only his own brigade was ordered to move. While the reason for separating the two brigades again is unknown, perhaps it was because Hayes men were new to Johnson’s division. Regardless of the reason the remaining Louisianans under Col. Zebulon York (6) were ordered to spread out and cover the interval between the Stonewall and Jones Brigade. (7)
Col. Carter spent much of his day vigorously complaining to Gen. Ewell about the weakness of the line. He also may have shared his views with Gen. Lee when the General made his early morning visit to Doles Salient.. Colonel Carter was particularly incensed by the fact that the shape of the line prevented mutually supporting fires by his guns. Because the slope between Doles Salient and the West Angle concealed the Federals, his guns had initially been unable to take Upton’s men under fire. To do so he had been forced to move guns out to unprotected positions in front of the works. There, from positions nearly out in front of the West Angle, his men had been exposed with their backs to the enemy. (8) Fortunately the Federals had not been in position to make him pay for such a rash move. This fact, corresponded with Lee’s instructions to Ewell the previous evening indicating a flanking position should, if possible be found, highlighted the need for guns to be placed along the left of Johnson’s line. (9)
Given Gen. Lee’s instructions and the obvious shortcomings that Col. Carter had highlighted the two remaining batteries of Cutshaw’s battalion were brought forward. Early in the afternoon General Long personally selected positions for the guns and supervised the placement of the batteries. Carrington’s battery had one section in the main line just to the left of the West Angle, the other at ninety degrees to it along the McCoull Lane. Tanner’s battery (10) was still further to the left at the junction between Hays and the Stonewall Brigade. All of these guns were intended to enfilade the field up to “Doles Salient”.
Long’s choice of positions for those guns was not well thought of by those affected. Both Maj. Cutshaw and Brig. Gen. James Walker, of the Stonewall Brigade, strongly objected. They particularly wanted Tanner’s Battery of 3 inch rifles moved “further into the offset”. (11) Their objections were overruled, probably because it would reduce the ability to enfilade Doles Salient.The troops themselves did not like the position at all, seeing that it would be subject to a crossfire. Complaints to the battery officers were met with agreement as well as the usual response that orders must be obeyed. So work began on emplacements for the guns and equipment as well as protection for the men. This work would continue as long as possible into the night. Horses, who by this time of the war were almost as valuable as men, were taken to positions of safety behind the second line. (12)
So throughout the day the Confederates had been working to prevent a repetition of Uptons success. At the same time there was a vigorous discussion among the leaders as to whether to abandon the salient or continue to hold it. Gen. Lee had again expressed how objectionable he found the line. However his opinion was not shared by the division commanders. Both Generals Rodes and Johnson continued to insist that, with their breastworks made, they could hold their positions. (13)
Throughout the day reports had been coming in from scouts and the cavalry that there was movement behind the Federal lines. Among other things infantry was seen moving toward Todd’s Tavern, while a body of wagons were moving in the general direction of Fredericksburg. As a result by early afternoon the suspicion that the Federals may be preparing to move began to gain credence. As a precaution Gen. Lee gave orders to Gen. William N. Pendelton, army chief of artillery, to prepare for a movement by the army. Pendelton then sent written orders to each of the corps artillery commanders. They were instructed to have their batteries ready by nightfall to march with the infantry. (14)
Late in the afternoon there was another meeting of General Officers at the Harrison House. Although the reports of enemy movement conflicted they seemed to generally indicate a move toward Fredericksburg. As a result Gen. Lee began to feel that a movement by the Federals was imminent. Accordingly Gen. Lee ordered Gen. Ewell to withdraw Johnson’s division and its supporting artillery from its position. Evidently Rodes’ division was not included in this order. Interestingly enough Gen. Johnson was not present at the time the decision was made, he was reconnoitering along his picket line. His absence would make itself felt latter. Gen. Ewell spoke up and suggested that the men would be more comfortable in the shelter of the trenches than if they were out in the open. Gen. Lee agreed and let the infantry stay in their positions. The supporting artillery however would be withdrawn as ordered and the horses allowed to graze. (15)
Gen. Long therefore ordered Col. Carter to withdraw the battalions of Nelson and Page. which occupied positions on both sides of the East Angle. These guns would go out by the farm lane which led across the run below the McCoul House and back past the Harrison House. Near the Brock Road the routes of the two battalions would separate. Nelson would veer left and continue on to his camp behind the Courthouse, while Page would turn to the right and cross the Brock Road onto the Trigg Farm. Because of the difficulty of negotiating the stream it would be best to move the guns out before dark. (16)
As these units were beginning their withdrawal Gen. Johnson returned from his reconnaissance. Not yet knowing of the decision to withdraw the artillery he demanded to know why the guns were being withdrawn, leaving his men unsupported. (17) Col. Carter, perhaps not wanting to get into a confrontation with the General could only tell him that while he and his men would prefer to stay they had their orders, which were to withdraw.
At some point during the withdrawal of the guns, Col. Carter met Maj. Robert Hardaway, several of whose batteries were supporting Rodes division to Johnson’s left. The Colonel informed him that all the guns were being pulled out at dark. This was a surprise to Major Hardaway, but being an experienced commander, he passed this news not only down to his battery commanders but also to Brig. Gen. Stephen Ramseur, the closest infantry brigade commander as well. (18)
For some reason Maj. Hardaway had some doubts about Colonel Carter’s news. Perhaps it was simply that while the Colonel outranked him, he was not his immediate commander. Gen. Long, had since the death of J. Thompson Brown in the Wilderness, directly controlled Brown’s Division of artillery of which Hardaway was a part. (19) Since Gen. Long had not sent him orders to move the Major went in search of the General. As it turned out he found both Generals Lee and Long at the Harrison House. When asked one of the Generals (20) responded that Colonel Carter was mistaken. It was not intended that Hardaway’s guns should move from their positions until the infantry did. His curiosity satisfied, Hardaway once again sent word to the various commanders, this time that they were not moving. Hardaway then proceeded on to his battalion’s camp behind the Courthouse.
While in the Salient Gen. Long had ordered Maj. Cutshaw to have his horses brought up to the guns from their positions behind the second line. Doing so would prevent any delay or confusion when the infantry moved. The previous afternoon, only a couple of hundred yards to the right, the hasty withdrawal of Nelson’s battalion had greatly inconvenienced the infantry. The troops to the right could barely get past in their attempt to move over and confront Upton. It was impressed on Cutshaw however that he was not to begin to move before the infantry of Johnson’s division did. Meanwhile the men of the newly arrived batteries of Carrington and Tanner continued to work on the emplacements for the guns.
Having had the horses brought forward Major Cutshaw went to Gen. Johnson in an effort to find out when the movement of the infantry could be expected. General Johnson could not answer the question however. He told the Major that he was unsure as to what his orders would be. Finding that there was no immediate need the Major then asked for permission to send his horses and sick men back to the battalion’s camp. After considering the request Johnson gave his permission for them to go. Certainly one of the things that the two men had to consider was that, until the horses were returned the guns would be immobile. Therefore there should have been an agreed time for the return of the horses to prevent any delay with moving the guns..
Each of the battery commanders of Cutshaw’s battalion were ordered to send the horses as well as sick men back to camp. There was some discussion in at least Carrington’s battery as to who would go back. It would normally be the Sergeant Major’s job to supervise the task. In this case Sergeant Hunter, who commanded one of the guns, was expected to receive his commission momentarily. Therefore he was tasked with taking the guns out while the Sergeant Major took over his gun. (21) This itself was an indication that no action was expected. Before he left for camp the Major was overheard, by Sergeant Major Davis telling Captain Carrington that he could expect orders in the early morning to move. (22) The route of march likely would be “out the road which ran thru the works” i. e. the McCoull Lane. Cutshaw then went on to the battalion camp on the Trigg Farm on the southern side of the Brock Road. Pages battalion also camped on this farm that night. It wasn’t long before the battalion executive officer, Major Stribling, joined him. He was able to report that when he left the front “all was well”.
When all the movements were finished the Salient once again grew quiet. Men put the last touches on the fortifications, ate, and generally settled in for another wet evening in the field. Commanders generally went to their headquarters to perform the administrative duties required before relaxing for the evening. And where did these men spend the evening?
General Lee returned to his headquarters camp. General Ewell is generally assumed to have spent the evening at or near the Harrison House. However, the topographer Maj. Jed Hotchkiss, whose wagons had been brought up to the intersection near the Frazier House during the day, gives a different version. He wrote in his diary that “the General” joined them for a period that evening. (23) Maj. Gen. Edward Johnson was at the McCoull House. He would stay either there or on the line the entire night. We do not know the exact whereabouts of Generals Robert Rodes and John Gordon but must assume they were with their commands.
The various artillery commanders were scattered about, at their respective headquarters that night. . General A. L. Long was at his camp, most likely on or near the grounds of the Harrison House. Colonel Thomas Carter was nearby but likely on the grounds of the Trigg Farm. (24) All of the battalion commanders were at their respective camps that night. Majors Carter Braxton, Robert Hardaway and William Nelson were with their battalions behind the Courthouse. Majors Wilfred Cutshaw and R.C. M. Page were their respective camps on the Trigg Farm. No artillery commanders other than the individual battery commanders were at the front that evening. On Johnson’s line Capt. Carrington was the ranking officer of the two batteries near the West Angle.
So was the Second Corps going to move that night? If not that night when? And if they were going to move where were they going to move to?
In my opinion the evidence is pretty conclusive that the anticipation was that they would be moving in the near future. There is no doubt though that they weren’t going to move during the night of the 11th. As to where they were going to move that depended on the Federals. Although the consensus seemed to be toward the right, perhaps toward Fredericksburg. So lets examine each of the questions separately.
It’s very obvious, from the accounts of both Campbell Brown and Thomas Carter, that Gen. Lee wanted to evacuate at least that part of the salient held by Johnson’s division. While Gordon’s division had built a line in front of the Harrison House when they arrived it had proven unsatisfactory. Enfilading artillery fire had forced it to be evacuated almost immediately. As a result work had been begun as early as the 9th on another line through the woods to the rear of the Harrison House. That line, which we call the “Final Line” today, would eliminate the salient altogether. When General Lee had floated that idea however he had met resistance from all the infantry commanders other than perhaps Gordon. Certainly the two division commanders, Robert Rodes and Edward Johnson, despite Upton’s success, insisted that they could hold their existing lines. However while this debate went on, reports of Federal movement continued to come in. These reports seemed to indicate that Grant was making the preliminary moves necessary before moving his army away from Spotsylvania. Therefore Gen. Lee, after consulting with his subordinates decided to abandon the salient. Doing so, which he had wanted to for several days, would position him to exercise one of several options. He could take up the new line under construction across the base of the salient. This line was shorter, more defensible while still allowing him to control the road network. In addition by moving Johnson back he would be much closer to either the Brock or Fredericksburg Roads, These would be the primary routes regardless of which way the army moved. So regardless of the direction of Grant’s movement he would be able to more quickly react. Therefore he ordered both the infantry as well as the artillery on Johnson’s divisional front to be withdrawn. Regardless of the reason for evacuating the salient, the artillery, or at least the bulk of it, must move first. Otherwise it would hinder the movement of the infantry,or be vulnerable without infantry support. Perhaps this is why he acquiesced to Ewell’s suggestion that the men would be more comfortable in the trenches. However as long as the infantry stayed in position they needed artillery support. Since Rodes had been fighting for intermittently for three days his need for support was obvious. Johnson however had not been attacked at all. Therefore there he had no real need for support. So the supporting guns could be withdrawn with little risk. The artillery that remained on his line, actually supporting Rodes, would have easy access to the roads to either withdraw or advance.
As to when the move was planned the evidence seems indisputable that they had no intention of moving that night. It seems most likely that they expected to move sometime the next morning. Certainly General Lee had instructed General Long to draw out the artillery along the front of Johnson’s division. It is notable that the senior officers didn’t mention anything about the withdrawal route being difficult to negotiate. That is only mentioned by either junior officers or those who were not in the artillery. As we discussed in the previous post Gen. Long used the orders to withdraw all but those units which would march with the infantry, i.e. Cutshaw’s and Hardaway’s battalions. Yet the infantry were allowed to stay in the trenches on Ewell’s suggestion, certainly until morning.. Therefore the horses of Cutshaw were allowed to be returned to camp for grazing. The only reason a commander as experienced as General Johnson would have allowed this was if there was no need for them. Obviously these horses would have to be returned before Cutshaw’s guns could move. Presumably Cutshaw and General Johnson had made some agreement as to what time the horses needed to be back. If so it could not have been at earliest dawn. We know that they were not back when Hancock’s attack was stopped below the re entrant line. Captain Garber had to, by Robert Rodes order, have his guns manually withdrawn and re oriented to fire on the advancing Federals. (25) Also neither Hardaway nor Cutshaw saw fit to stay at the line that night. As a result neither one was there when the battle opened. Hardaway was wounded by shellfire on his way back. Cutshaw didn’t join Garber until the struggle to hold the reentrant line. (26) Again the actions of the artillery show pretty conclusively that the move would not be made that night.
People have to make decisions based on the information they have. The decision often times is simply the lesser of two evils. And sometimes it involves taking a calculated risk. That is what happened I believe on May 11th around the Harrison House. Experienced leaders made a decision that didn’t turn out the way they thought it would. The result is history.
In closing I would like to ask …… Is the real issue here the leadership style of Robert E. Lee? The fact that he gave too much leeway to his subordinates? That he chose not to follow his instincts and order his subordinates to take the difficult course? That he should have overruled Ewell and his division commanders and abandoned the line? Perhaps history would have taken a different course if he had.
I welcome any comments or discussion that people may have. Trying to interpret the intentions of people is difficult at best, and surely there is room for debate.
(1) SHSP Vol. 21, pages 239-242. “Colonel Thomas H. Carter’s letter” both this comment and the one in the next paragraph were in this same article published in 1893. In a letter to John W. Daniel in 1904, declining to write the history of the Virginia Artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia he merely attributes the loss of the salient to the absence of the artillery. This is a simplified version of what he wrote to his wife immediately after the event.
(2) Quoting from a private letter from Thomas Carter to his wife May 24, 1864.
(3) A Federal sketch map does show a second line behind Dole’s salient. However Lt. Doyle of the 33rd Virginia, Stonewall Brigade referred to a line of rifle pits being built on the 11th. A detailed examination of the ground shows what appears to be a unit boundary along the second line. There is a slight change of direction as well as a difference in the construction.
(4) some of the Virginians thought they were only in the line for about one half hour.
(5) Hays was wounded, whether by shellfire or a sniper’s bullet is not clear, and replaced by his senior regimental commander Col. William Monaghan of the 6th Louisiana. Accounts vary as to whether Hayes was wounded on the 9th or the 10th. There are conflicting accounts as to who was actually in command of the combined Louisiana brigades after Hayes was wounded.
(6) when Leroy Stafford was killed in the Wilderness the next in command was Col. Zebulon York of the 14th Louisiana. However, as part of the reorganization done so that John B. Gordon would be senior Brigadier, thus division commander in Jubal Early’s absence both Louisiana Brigades were consolidated under Harry Hays and placed in Johnson’s Division.
(7) Moving Hays men only is an interesting decision. The number of his men alone, roughly 800, didn’t equal Doles losses much less his total strength prior to Upton’s attack. That would have required that both brigades of Louisianians be moved. So if the Louisianians occupied Doles entire section of the line it was actually weaker, not stronger. Also was it only Stafford’s Brigade that spread out, or did Jone’s and the Stonewall also? Regardless this move lengthened and weakened Johnson’s line, both at the point that Hancock would strike the next day and where Upton had struck as well. Yet perhaps it was simply that Ewell did specifically order that Hayes brigade be given the job. BTW: Hayes was wounded and not on the field May 12. There are conflicting accounts of whether he was wounded on the 9th or the 10th.
(8) To take a position outside of the works with their backs to the enemy showed both ingenuity as well as desperation. Mott’s men were still in the woods beyond the Landrum House, while Burnside corps was astride the Fredericksburg road.
(9) Lee had sent instructions to Ewell at 8:15 pm pointedly giving him instructions as to measures he wanted taken due to Rodes being so quickly overwhelmed. Note also that the timing of the note indicates that it was only two hours after Upton had begun his attack.
(10) The battery was actually commanded by the senior Lieutenant, 1st Lieutenant Benjamin C. Maxwell. Capt. Tanner had been so severely wounded at Bristoe Station that he had been left behind and captured by the Federals. Maxwell was an ancestor of this writer who had enlisted as a private, been elected sergeant and risen thru the ranks due to the misfortunes of others. At the time of Tanner’s wounding he had been the senior Lieutenant, thus assuming command.
(11) Major Cutshaw also wrote that Tanner’s battery was in a “slight offset” just to Rodes left in a “slight offset” He obviously meant to Rodes right rather than his left. His use of the word “offset” I take to mean salient or bend in the line. Thus a small bend just to Rodes right. As to the objections of Cutshaw and Walker it seems apparent that both men wanted the battery closer to the right of the Stonewall Brigade. Moving them more in that direction would come up again during the evening.
(12) “Second line” would most likely be what we today call “Gordon’s” line. Today the line behind the main line from the re-entrant to the right of the McCoul lane is referred to as the second line. However the participants themselves did not.
(13) Col. Thomas Carter letter to his wife May 15. Another version of this story says that Gen. Ewell convinced Gen. Lee that the troops would be more sheltered from the rain in the positions in the salient. I think that both are true simply referring to separate events. That seems apparent because of Carter’s inclusion of General Johnson, and Johnson’s not knowing the guns were to be withdrawn. However the question is where did Lee think they were going to go? Unless they were actually going to move to put them in the open until breastworks could be built would appear to be risky.
(14) Surely the infantry corps commanders were given similar orders by Lee himself. However none of them mention it in their later writing. Ewell did say that Gen. Lee had information that the Federals were preparing to move. Nor does Jed Hotchkiss who wrote in his diary that the enemy appeared to be moving to the left.
(15) Campbell Brown Papers, Tennessee State Library
(16) Today you can see that on the south side of the current park road this stream, Meadow Run, becomes a swamp. On the other side of the road, back almost as far as the spring, it is a tranquil small stream. At some places, particularly near the west McCoull Lane, capable of being jumped by an average adult male. However below the house and to its right the banks are steep and unfriendly. As you near the marsh the banks flatten and it becomes easier to cross.That said the spring was capped years ago which may affect these observations. That said the pioneers could have easily built bridges across the stream at virtually any point. But since the accounts talk about the marshy bottom it would clearly seem to indicate a point near, but to the left of the current park road.
(17) Gen. Johnson would say later that during his reconnaissance he had seen no evidence of Federal activity in his front.
(18) Hardaway in his article published in a Richmond newspaper would say he notified Ramseur. Ramseur was in command of the infantry brigade which Hardaway’s guns were in immediate support of.
(19During the winter Gen. Long had divided the artillery into two divisions. These were commanded by Colonels Brown and Carter. In the orders creating the divisions he had specified that in the event of something happening to one of them, the Corps artillery commander would take command of his division. To confuse matters even more however in some places Carter is referred to as commanding the artillery in the salient.
(20) Maj. Hardaway identified the Generals as Gen’ls L. and L.” This can only be Lee and Long. He says only that Gen’l L. clarified his orders. It really makes no difference which. As the two were together they essentially spoke with one voice.
(21) Sergeant Major Wilbur Fiske Davis said that they were expecting battle shortly and that he asked for the change. More likely it was to give the young sergeant a task of larger responsibility with an easy assignment. In battle the Sergeant Major would be responsible for ammo supply, management of the horses, etc. Duties much more important to the functioning of the battery than commanding a single gun. It seems unlikely then that they were expecting anything important to happen during the night.
(22) This, if true means that both Johnson and Cutshaw were not anticipating a move that night.
(23) Fraziers is over a mile from the Harrison House. When the General arrived and departed is not mentioned in the Hotchkiss Diary. Diary of Maj. Jed Hotchkiss, page 203-204 His actual reference is to “the General”. This is the term he had earlier used for Jackson and seemed to transfer to Ewell after Jackson’s demise. As confirmation he mentions every day for the next several days that “the General” stayed at the front.
(24) I must admit both of these are educated guesses. Both Cutshaw’s and Page’s camps were on the Trigg Farm. Since Colonel Carter physically met with Maj. Page before he led his battalion to the front the next morning. Also Carter had until recently commanded Pages battalion. Therefore it would be likely that he camped with those units as well.
Carter just said he was “back with General Long” or otherwise “near General Long”. The Corps commander would have wanted his artillery commander nearby therefore the Harrison House grounds seems likely.
(25) It is interesting to note the difference in the way the division commanders acted toward the artillery. Johnson had given Maj. Cutshaw permission to withdraw the artillery. Yet during the night, when Capt. Carrington suggested moving either his own or Tanners battery to a more favorable position, Johnson said he would have the horses sent for. Rodes on the other hand ordered Garber, whose horses had not been returned, to move his guns to the rear by hand. Admittedly the battle was raging when Rodes gave his order.
(26) One of the unanswered questions is when did Cutshaw start his horses and drivers back to the front. We would expect that Carter would have informed Cutshaw when he had Pages men alerted. Gen. Long’s comment about Page’s return. That they left so swiftly that nobody noticed it. Who would have been there other than Cutshaw’s men? Cutshaw naturally went to Garber’s position. The whereabouts of the rest of his men is uncertain.
In the next post tentatively titled “The March that Never Happened”, we will look at the prospects for the Second Corps moving away from Spotsylvania during the night of May 11/12/
Much has been made over the last one hundred and fifty years about the withdrawal of the artillery from the “Mule Shoe” on May 11, 1864. Or more accurately, the artillery which could have been at the point that Hancock’s Federal Corp struck the next morning. The generally accepted reason given is that Gen. Lee anticipated the Federals moving away from Spotsylvania Courthouse during the night. If they did so he did not want the guns to hinder the movement of the infantry away from the lines around the Courthouse. In fact the Federals did not move but instead attacked the apex of the “Mule Shoe”. It was this miscalculation which, according to most people, certainly most Confederates, led directly to the initial disaster on May 12.
Disposition of Second Corps Artillery Battalions at sunset May 11, 1864
So lets take a look at that event and see if we can perhaps dig a little deeper as to why it may have happened.
First to be clear while guns were certainly withdrawn it is incorrect to say “the” guns were withdrawn from the “Mule Shoe”. On the afternoon of the 11th there were 46 Confederate cannon within the boundaries of the “Mule Shoe” Salient. (1) Of these guns only 26, from Nelson’s and Page’s battalions would be withdrawn later that afternoon. Therefore 20 cannon, from Cutshaw’s and Hardaway’s battalions, still remained in the Salient when Hancock struck the next morning. While still a formidable force unfortunately for the Confederates none of them were able to take Hancock’s assault force under fire before they broke through the line. The repositioning of forces following Upton’s charge, combined with the preperations for a march away from Spotsylvania had seen to that.
The manner in which the withdrawal of guns was executed however is quite interesting. The premise for this is generally given that “those guns which were difficult to access” were to be withdrawn. An additional justification is that it was predicted to be “a dark rainy night”. Both reasons appear, at least on the surface to be quite reasonable. Yet Brig. Gen. Armistead Long, commander of the artillery of the Second Corp is singled out for criticism, albeit in a left-handed way, for withdrawing guns prior to the order to march. Of course this is because of the disaster on the morning of the 12th. It is seldom mentioned that the sector the guns were withdrawn from had been relatively inactive. Nor is it mentioned that as a result of Upton’s charge the same sector had been devoid of guns at the same time the previous day. But the comparison is always made to Brig. Gen. Porter Alexander, Gen. Longs counterpart in the First Corps. Alexander, although making preparations to move choose not to withdraw any of his guns prior to the movement of the troops. Interestingly enough Col. Lindsey Walker of the Third Corps is not mentioned in the matter. Preliminary research indicates that he, like Alexander, chose not to withdraw guns from the line.
So why did Gen. Long chose to withdraw those particular guns? Was it simply that they were “difficult to access”?, or perhaps the luck of the draw? Before we address that question I must say that in succeeding posts we will look at the subject of a proposed march in much more detail. However first to understand what happened we need to go back a few days to the Battle of the Wilderness.
May, 7, 1864. The day before the Second Corps marched from the Wilderness to Spotsylvania Courthouse. By now both armies had decided that this battle was over. The Confederates were trying to anticipate Grant’s next move so that they could preempt it. As a result preparations were made to move the army.
While it is certainly true that the battle of the Wilderness was primarily an infantry fight it was not exclusively so. On the front of the Second Corps all five artillery battalions were ultimately involved. Casualties, while not heavy did include Col. J. Thompson Brown, who was killed by a Federal sharpshooter on the 6th. Col. Brown, along with Col. Thomas Carter had been given command of a division of the artillery, reporting directly to Gen. Long.
On the afternoon of the 7th, Gen. Long ordered the battalions of Cutshaw , Hardaway and Nelson to withdraw their battalions to the vicinity of Verdiersville. The last of these units would arrive and go into camp at around 2 am the morning of the 8th. From there these battalions would march at 1 P.M. that same day by a separate route from the infantry. Their route would take them by way of Antioch Church on Terry’s Creek, to the North Anna and finally they would camp on the Po River near Shady Grove the evening of the 8th. They would not arrive at Spotsylvania Courthouse until sometime on the 9th.
Meanwhile the remaining battalions of Carter Braxton and R.C.M. Page marched with the infantry on the more direct route toward Spotsylvania Courthouse. Note that only two battalions marched with the three divisions of infantry, not the customary one per division of infantry. These batteries arrived near the Courthouse along with the infantry late on the afternoon of the 8th.
Now lets move back forward to the afternoon of the 11th. The artillery of the Corps is distributed as follows. Braxton’s Battalion is in reserve near the Courthouse as are the heaviest guns in the Corps, the 20 lbers of the Rockbridge Artillery from Hardaways battalion. Smith’s battery from Hardaways Battalion is in camp refitting and recovering from the hammering it had taken on the 10th. The Salem Artillery, also of Hardaway’s Battalion, had yet to join the army, being delayed because of a lack of horses.
The remaining two batteries of Hardaway’s battalion, along with Garber’s battery of Cutshaw’s Battalion were in the line in front of the Harrison House. They were in direct support of Rodes Division. Cutshaw’s remaining two batteries along with the entirety of Nelson and Page’s Battalions were in support of Johnson’s Division in the toe of the “Mule Shoe”.
Gen. Long was evidently instructed to remove those guns difficult to access late in the afternoon of the 11th. (2) He then went to Col. Carter and instructed him to withdraw Nelson and Page’s battalions to their camps for grazing and water. (3) He also met with Maj. Wilfred Cutshaw and ordered him to have his horses brought up from behind the second line. (4) While preparations were to be made for a move he was not to move before the infantry did. (5) Similar instructions would later be given to Maj. Hardaway.
With the withdrawal of Col. Carter along with the battalions of Neslon and Page the infantry were, like in the Wilderness, left with two battalions to march with them. Neither of these battalions had accompanied them on the march to Spotsylvania. Which would fit the standard procedure of rotating the order of march. Units were rotated if at all possible to share the hardship of bringing up the rear.
As darkness fell on May 11th the artillery dispositions of the Second Corps, as it anticipated moving away from Spotsylvania, were thus roughly the same as they had been before leaving the Wilderness. Was this coincidence or by design? Of course we will never know because they did not march that day. When they did move later the battalion organization was totally different. So again was Gen. Long a “creature of Habit?”
The next post tentatively titled “The March that Never Happened” will look at the prospects for the Second Corps moving away from Spotsylvania on the night of May 11/12.
(1) Hardaway had 8, Cutshaw 12, Nelson 12, Page 14.
(2) The term “evidently” is chosen deliberately as there is a great deal of confusion on this point. Whether it was in the form of an order or a suggestion is not clear. Plus as will be addressed in a later post it was not at all clear that the army would be moving that night, in fact probable it would not.
(3) Carter was in charge of the guns within the “Mule Shoe”. Perhaps this why he told Maj. Hardaway that his guns were to be withdrawn. Hardaway, evidently doubting those instructions, went to Gen. Long himself and found that Carter was wrong. He was, like Cutshaw, to only move when the infantry did.
(4) This would be what we today call Gordon’s Line, not the reserve line running about a hundred or so yards behind Rodes right and extended across the McCoull Lane on the 11th
(5) Gen. Long had personally supervised the placement of Carrington and Tanner’s batteries only a few hours earlier. In fact he had placed Tanner’s battery in a position he had chosen over the objections of Maj. Cutshaw and Gen. Walker commanding the Stonewall Brigade.
Sketch of area described in post. Area of interest is left of McCoull Lane
“Tanner’s battery was placed into the line being in a small offset”. The words of Wilfred Cutshaw who commanded the battalion. For more time than I am willing to admit I have tried to fit those words into what I see on the ground.
Finally the answer. In an article he wrote for a Richmond newspaper Maj. Robert Hardaway answered my question. When describing the action involving the recapture of Smith’s guns on the evening of May 10 he said “Our works about thirty yards to the right had a second line run back to the rear about eighty yards long, to protect the hollow through which the Yankees broke in. When our men from Ramseur’s brigade and left advanced down our works to the right they stopped at this offset…….”.
So there we have it. While Hardaway was describing the re-entrant line at Dole’s Salient, there must have been a somewhat similar line or projection on the other end of the second line.
Now to try and find it.
Field Visit 3/15/14
Yesterday I went out and looked for evidence of gun positions in the second or reserve line in the salient. Specifically in the second line to the left or south of Carrington’s positions at and around the West Angle. The results I’m afraid were inconclusive, although interesting.
To the left, or south, of the McCoull Lane there is a section of the reserve trench that has possibilities. Along most of its length it appears to be a typical rifle trench, although not far from the McCoull Lane it has a pair of places wide enough to accommodate the trail of a cannon. Both of theses places have intrench traverses on their right hand side. In addition there is another section of the trench slightly further to the left where for about 20 yards where the rear is opened enough to allow guns to have been there. Unfortunately my pictures aren’t good enough to shown the detail.
Section of the second line Left of McCoull Lane, note in trench traverse
Another look at the second line. Standing water of course defines a low point in the trench.
Another section of the second line.
One thing that makes this section of the line difficult to interpret is the runoff. Not only the natural runoff down the trench from the rise to the left, but also from two culverts put in by the CCC back in the thirties. Water from one of these as well as natural flow has cut through the reserve line on its way to a natural watercourse which flows toward the McCoull Spring.
There is another very interesting feature found along this section of the second line. There are four wide baulks found in the trench. Separated by about 15-20 yards they appear to be wide enough to pass a vehicle across the trench. Certainly men could have walked over. While it is entirely possible that they were done during postwar logging another explanation seems more likely. In addition similar baulks are not found right or north of the McCoull Lane.
When the second line was completed up to the McCoull Lane the troops in the main line were cut off from a direct route to the rear. Regardless they still needed supplies of water, food, and ammunition to be brought up and wounded men evacuated. So how would it have been done? Once the line was completed to the McCoull Lane either they had to go around and cross the Lane or cross the works. These wide baulks would conceivably enable men, animals, and vehicles to walk or roll over the line as easily as along the lane. Or if Cutshaw really meant “in a small offset” to mean between the lines, the guns could have been brought into that area over these baulks. Admittedly this thought did not occur to me until I had left for the day. Would they have required a ramp on the front side? Or was the parapet low enough men and animals carrying a load could step up or down? Some thing for next trip.
Note wide balk to the left of the picture.
There are several features in that area which could be possibly been a location of ammo chests, or officers locations. Two medium-sized crescent-shaped positions exist, one of them shown below is near the field behind Dole’s line. However there are none of the large positions we find behind the West Angle.
Crescent shaped feature between the lines. Note how close to the field.
It is surprising that the feature pictured above has survived at all. There is ample evidence of postwar work, either agricultural or logging , encroaching toward the lane almost to the wet area between the two lines. Any wartime features would have most likely been eradicated by such work.
Second Line: I walked the entire length of the second line yesterday looking for traces of artillery. With the exception of the features described above there is little to distinguish it. On the slight rise immediately to the left of the section discussed above there are some fairly typical in trench traverses. However nowhere near the wide baulks I have already described. There may be one of those still further to the left however.
Also it appears that perhaps that this line could have been built-in stages, or perhaps by different units. Beginning at its intersection with the re-entrant line (btw there is a shallow scrape that appears to be evidence that this reserve line actually began to the south of this intersection point by at least some 30 yards or so) the line curls around the back side of the small ridge. Along this section there are a series of 5 holes, each around three feet behind the rear wall of the ditch. Perhaps for officers, or ammunition is difficult to tell. However the spacing and closeness to the trench almost certainly means that they were built by the occupants of the line.These holes are reminiscent however of what we see at Cold Harbor, although not as large or well defined.
Midway across the field the line makes an abrupt turn to run almost directly to the McCoull Lane. From that turning point the line runs almost straight northward finally crossing the McCoull lane. Nowhere along that entire stretch do we see more of the pits or holes just a typical rifle trench. There are however several traverses along the relatively flat section behind the new pine woods. This would have been behind area where the right of Rodes and the left of the Stonewall Brigade connected.
Conclusion: Tanner’s battery was most likely in the main line just south of the McCoull Lane. Ammunition was staged between the two lines while the caissons were behind the second line in the direction of the McCoull spring. Although it must be said that there is no surviving construction behind the second line south of the McCoull Lane. But they definitely had a way to cross the works when they wished.
An interesting area to explore, one that has seen little research to date.
One of the things that makes history so fascinating is trying to not only understand WHAT happened, but WHY it happened. Sometimes its the little things that have major consequences. And because they seemed little things at the time we don’t know much about them.
The incident I am going to describe, should have been just a simple administrative decision. Yet, that simple process profoundly affected the lives of hundreds of men and certainly the results of a battle. Of course it goes without saying that these decisions were made by men doing the best they could with the information and resources they had at the time.
When Lt. S. H. Pendelton (1) awoke Col. Thomas Carter in the early morning of May 12th, 1864 he was delivering orders from the Corps commander, Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell, and endorsed by the Corps artillery commander Brig. Gen. Armistead Long. The order was for Col. Carter to return the artillery to the salient where it could support Maj. Gen. Edward Johnson’s division. Carter endorsed the note saying that it was then twenty minutes to dawn but the guns would be returned as soon as possible. He then sent Lt. Pendelton on to Maj. R. C. M. Page to relay the order to return the guns of his battalion to the Salient.
The receipt of this order triggered a burst of activity in the artillery camp on the Trigg Farm. From Page the order had to be passed down to each of the four batteries. Of course to carry out the order both the men and horses, had to be awakened. Then the horses harnessed, attached to guns and vehicles, and brought into line to assemble the march column. All of this in the middle of a dark rainy night with little lighting to ease the process.
While this was being done Col. Carter met with Maj. Page and they discussed the positions that the guns were to take up when they arrived back at the Salient. (2) Both Col. Carter and Maj. Page were familiar with the positions with the Confederate positions within the Mule Shoe. Col. Carter, commanded not only a division of the Second Corps artillery, but had been placed in direct command of the artillery within the Mule Shoe itself by Gen. Long. Maj. Page’s battalion had occupied a position around the apex of the Mule Shoe for the last several days. His men were being sent back to positions in the line that they had left not twelve hours previously.
It is important to note that at this point there was no definite information beyond Gen. Johnson’s fear that the Federals were massing in his front for an attack. Therefore the two commanders decided that the batteries would take up positions from roughly a hundred yards to the left of the apex to the salient where the line turned to run down to Meadow Run. Therefore the batteries would go into position in the same formation they had held the previous day. From left to right the batteries would be in this order, Montgomery, Carter, Fry and Reese. (see attached sketch) So far everything is apparently straightforward.
Proposed positions of Page’s batteries morning of May 12, 1864 AM.
But it is in the execution of the order that we can begin to ask ourselves “why did they do that”? In describing the march one of the participants described the route to be traveled once the column reached the part of the route that ran behind the Confederate works. In his words it was “the narrow space between the works and the trees”. And of course this would have been further complicated by tree stumps, tents, ammo boxes, etc. In short all of the things that litter a battlefield. So we know that there wasn’t a great deal of room for the vehicles and teams to maneuver. Therefore we would expect Montgomery’s battery, which being supposed to go to the left of the apex, had the furthest distance to travel to lead the way. Then Carter, Fry and finally Reese would bring up the rear of the column.
Actual order of march Page’s Battalion
However Montgomery’s battery did not lead the column as we would suppose. Instead, according to Thomas Carter himself “my brother Willie’s battery leading by turn”. So Carter’s battery was in the lead, Montgomery’s battery followed in the second position. Because there was not enough room to pass Carter’s vehicles, (3) Montgomery’s men would have to wait in column while Carter put his guns in the works. As it turned out only two of Carter’s guns were able to get into position, the remaining two, as well as Montgomery’s entire battery were caught in column and overrun while waiting for the route to be cleared.
We do know that there was at least a brief amount of time after its arrival before the Federals overwhelmed the defenders. Maj. Page pointed out to Capt. Carter the position he was to take. He then moved back down the column and showed the Lieutenants of Fry’s battery as well as Capt. Reese of the Jeff Davis artillery the positions they were to take. He left Reese’s battery and was returning to the apex when he was almost killed or captured by the Federals that had broken thru.
But again the position assigned to the one section of Fry’s battery on the field that morning was not what we would have expected. Certainly the position pointed out by Maj. Page, was not the position they had occupied the day before. Rather as Lt. Hawes stated later they (the two 3 inch rifles)were ” put in position in the “open” before reaching the works made for our guns the day before”. (4) They were placed in a position to fire over the works in front rather than from the prepared gun pits.
Were these changes made by Page, or Carter? Why, given the supposed urgency of the need to return to the Salient was the order of march what it was? Was the habit of rotating the units in a march column so ingrained that they didn’t think about it? (5) Why did they chose a different position for Fry’s guns then the one they had prepared the day before? If they had no definite knowledge of a Federal attack, why did they decide to change positions? We will probably never know the answer unless some document comes to light shedding more light on it. And did it make any difference in the result? We will never know, however Lieutenant S. H. Hawes who commanded one of Fry’s guns had this to say “I believe we could have driven them back had we been in position of day before, provided Jones’ Brigade had protected our flank.” (6) We do know that three of the four batteries fired on the Federals that morning. Only Montgomeries battery evidently did not.
But it is interesting to wonder what drove the decisions those men made that dark rainy morning in Spotsylvania County back in 1864.
(1) Its not clear whether Lt. Pendelton was attached to Gen. Ewell’s staff, or that of Gen. Long. Accounts state it either way, as Pendelton evidently had been involved in some controversy at his previous command.
(2) S. H. Hawes to Wilfred Cutshaw Oct. 7, 1905. How long did the two men have to make their decisions? While we don’t really know, Lt. Hawes said “we lay waiting for marching orders for about one hour” In the dark with the excitement and activity that figure seems open to question.
(3) Horse drawn artillery is difficult to put into earthworks. First the vehicle has to come up parallel to the works and make a turn to get perpendicular to the works. Then, because of the difficulty in having multiple horses back up, the gun is unhooked from the limber and run by hand into the position. The ammo chest is typically removed from the limber and placed on the ground. Then the limber is driven away. Time consuming business.
(4) S. H. Hawes to Wilfred Cutshaw Oct. 7, 1905. In his letter Hawes described the position before they left it on the 11th. Saying that Carters battery had been to their left, and that earthworks with traverses for the infantry had been thrown up.
(5) It was standard procedure in the Army of Northern Virginia to rotate the units that led a march. For example the unit that was at the rear of a column today, would be in the lead tomorrow.
(6) S. H. Hawes to Wilfred Cutshaw, Oct. 7, 1905. In this letter the former Lt. who had commanded one of the two 3 inch rifles of Fry’s battery that morning, gives an account of the events of the morning. From the time orders were given to have the horses hitched up until he was captured at his gun.
Perhaps its just me, but one of the things I enjoy the most is trying to nail down the location of a unit at any particular time. Of course we generally only have the testimony of a few people to go on. But some times its pretty easy.
I was rereading the manuscript for “Contributions to a history of the Richmond Howitzers”, in particular the chapter “A Diary of the War”. In it the author was describing the events of May 12 at Spotsylvania and he left some pretty good clues as to where they occurred. So perhaps we can decipher the location.
After being mauled during Upton’s charge on the 10th the battery was withdrawn to refit. Because of the losses, both of men and horses, they were only able to field two detachments. These would man the two-three inch rifles. Lieutenant Henry Carter was in command, Corporal Flournoy commanded the 1st detachment, and Sergeant White the 2nd.
Early on the morning of the 12th the battery was ordered forward from the camps and halting in a wood near the lines, reported to Captain Graham of the Rockbridge Artillery. This battery you may remember was not in the salient but back in front of the Courthouse. There they could take advantage of the longer range of their rifles.
While awaiting further orders a passing Major of artillery took it upon himself to order that the guns be left where they were and only the cannoneers go forward. By doing so they would be available to man the guns captured by the Federals that morning when they were recaptured. Captain Graham giving his approval the men from the gun crews went forward.
The position they arrived at being exposed to the fire sweeping across the Salient the men had to seek shelter. And it is in describing that shelter that we have our clues.
– some men took shelter behind log houses
– others took shelter in trenches nearly filled with water.
– Sergeant White took shelter behind a little house not much larger than a chicken coop. However it had a chimney “tall enough for a shot tower”
– they were behind the position they had held on the 10th.
So where were they? Certainly near but not at the Harrison House. Amongst its outbuildings? Or were there other buildings?
– They could see the artillery massed near them at the Harrison House and watch thirty horses shot down by Federal minie balls.
When we look back at historical events we do so with selective vision. We focus on those things that stand out and interest us. Generally these are some type of action or perhaps the exercise of initiative in some fashion. Perhaps its the hero giving the order for the grand charge, or maybe the charge itself.
But it wasn’t that way for the participants was it? These people existed in the current vernacular 24/7/365. The days weren’t spent doing nothing but fighting, they still had to live. Eating, personal hygiene and all the mundane tasks that are required to make an army function have to be performed as well. And the battlefield wasn’t a neat place, everyone in their proper place, shoulder to shoulder, at attention with a heroic look on the face. Rather it was a constantly shifting kaleidoscope, of troop movements large and small, officers and orderlies dashing too and fro, malingerers and skulkers, details, etc.
One episode I have found interesting occurred behind Doles Salient on the night of May 10. Smith’s Battery of the Richmond Howitzers had been overrun by the Federals during Upton’s charge that afternoon. Shortly thereafter the guns had been recaptured and put back into action by the Confederates. Since the men of Smith’s battery had either become casualties or dispersed, the guns had been manned by an ad hoc group for much of the fight. However, General Lee personally ordered Captain Asher Garber to take his gunners and man the guns. This he did and along with the men he found there fought the battle to its conclusion.
It was obvious that Smith’s battery was unfit because of its losses to maintain the position the following day, particularly if the Federals resumed the attack. Therefore Captain Garber was ordered to place his battery in the position. Of course, this meant that his own guns would take the position. So to make room the guns from the Howitzers were pulled by hand from the pits and taken to a position of safety a short distance behind the line (1). The survivors along with the remaining horses were then ordered to the rear for rest.
However, even in a position of “safety”, behind the Confederate lines, at night, the guns could not be left unguarded. A detail of men, under a sergeant, was left to protect the battery. These men stayed with the guns all night and accompanied them to the rear when Garber’s men moved them toward the artillery camps. (2)
So was the guard detail just because that’s how things were done? Or, was it to prevent wandering Confederates from helping themselves to any and everything useful? While guns are what is mentioned we can probably assume the caissons, and all other line equipment was there as well. My guess is that they knew things would walk away during the night if not guarded.
An interesting little note about soldiering even in the midst of a battle.
(1) In the article “A Diary of the War” Found in “Contributions to a History of the Richmond Howitzers” the author says they were removed and taken back 75-100 yards.
(2) General Long visited the area and after telling the guard detail that they would be reequipped immediately ordered Garber to move the guns. En route they met a detail under the ranking Lieutenant of the battery, Henry Carter, coming with battalion horses to remove the guns. The transfer was made and the guns taken to camp by their rightful owners.
When we look back at historical events we do so with selective vision. We focus on those things that stand out and nterest us. Generally these are some type of action or perhaps the exercise of inititive in some fashion. Perhaps its the hero giving the order for the grand charge, or maybe the charge itself.
But it wasn’t that wayfor the participants was it? These people existed in the current vernacular 24/7/365.
Throughout the day of May 10 the Federal skirmishers had made life miserable for the gunners of Smith’s Company of the Richmond Howitzers. Not just them but the infantry of Dole’s and Daniels brigades of Robert Rodes Division dug in along that same section of the defensive line near Spotsylvania Courthouse. Shortly before sunset the Confederates were to find out why.
View from in front of the Confederate lines looking toward Doles Salient. the farm road that Upton’s men guided on runs along the crest in the distance.
From the time the Second Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia had taken up defensive positions near Spotsylvania Courthouse on May 8th, artillery support had been provided by the two battalions that had accompanied them on the march from the Wilderness. Along Maj. Gen. Robert Rodes line support had initially been provided by the three batteries of Major Carter Braxton’s battalion. The four batteries of Major R.C.M. Pages battalion similarly supported Maj. Gen. Edward Johnson’s division on the right of the corps line. When the remaining three artillery battalions arrived near the battlefield those units could be relieved and given a brief rest. During the early morning hours of the 10th Braxton’s men and guns were quietly withdrawn from their positions along the line. At sunrise on the morning of the 10th three batteries from the newly arrived battalion of Maj. Robert Hardaway occupied those recently vacated positions. However only the light artillery pieces, Napoleon’s and 3 inch rifles, were to be used here, the heavier 20 lb rifles of the battalions remaining battery, the 2nd company Rockbridge Artillery, were placed near the Courthouse where the open fields were more suitable to the range of their weapons.
Crude sketch by author of the key positions during Upton’s assault.
The light artillery batteries were dispersed into positions along Rodes line in the following manner. On the left was Capt. Lorraine Jones Second Company of the Richmond Howitzers. His guns were placed among the infantry of Ramseur’s Brigade. Approximately two hundred yards and fifty or so yards to the right (1) along the line of Daniels Brigade were the men of Capt. Benjamin Smith’s Third Company of the Richmond Howitzers.interestingly enough there were no guns along thhe line held by Dole’s brigade. the battalions last battery, Dance’s, was in position supporting the left center of Johnson’s Division a short distance to the right. (2)
Smith’s Battery was, like many in Confederate service, although unique within hardway’s battalion, hybrid or mixed battery. That is the type of guns was not uniform. The first section consisted of two-three inch rifles, while two 12 pound Napoleons made up the second section. While this complicated the supply situation it had advantages in the terrain that the units habitually fought in. The 3 inch rifle, when used with good ammunition, had more range and was more accurate, particularly at longer ranges. The Napoleon, with its larger bore, was more effective with canister, therefore better in the short-range defensive role. For this reason perhaps the rifles were placed on the batteries right where it was more open, while the smooth bores were placed on the left closer to the woods which ran up to the line on their left. (3)
To make room for Smith’s guns five companies of infantry from Daniel’s North Carolina brigade had to move from the works. These men who had constructed the positions the artillery assumed would take up new positions in a second line just to the rear of the main line. Connected to the main line by a re-entrant line close to daniel’s right, which ran perpendicular to the main line approximately sixty yards to the rear. This line ended where a farm road separated it from another line of works which ran parallel to the main line. This line ran down the hill toward the Confederate right and like the re-entrant line was intended to provide support for the main line in the evevt of a breakthough along the swale.
Looking along the Second line toward the McCoull Lane which runs just inside the woodline in the distance. Photo taken from almost directly behind the point Upton’s men broke thru.
Beginning about thirty yards to the left of the re-entrant the positions Smith’s four guns took up was overlooking an open field that sloped slightly downward toward a dense pine woods approximately 300 yards away. Beginning about 200 yards to the left of Smith’s position the Confederate line ran thru a body of oak woods. This section of the Confederate line was roughly straight as far as could be seen. To his right the ground rose slightly to a crest about 225 yards away. The line of works curved out gradually toward the woods until they reached the crest where they turned back to the right. This turn together with a grove of pine trees within the confederate lines prevented a clear view of the positions to the right. Just beyond the crest was a farm road that led out across the field to the woods then on to the Shelton House. Thus the field commanded by the guns was about 300 yards deep by 350-400 yards wide.
As soon as it became light enough to see a target firing between the opposing pickets and skirmishers began. This fighting would continue throughout the day as each side struggled to gain an advantage. During the day the skirmishers from Dole’s Brigade on the right had not been able to push the Federal skirmishers back further away from the Confederate works. In front of Daniel’s Brigade, to their left, was somewhat a different story. On his right, and in front of Smith’s Company, Gen. Daniels had not posted any skirmishers, perhaps because of the open field which could be covered by the artillery. On his left however where the oak woods led right up to his works he had concentrated a considerable number. (4) These men suffered significant casualties from the Federal skirmishers. The result of this odd arrangement was that the Federals were able to penetrate between the groups of Confederate skirmishers to within rifle range of the works. As a result several casualties were suffered among Smith’s men and they were greatly harassed in their efforts to work the guns. By nine o’clock the situation necessitated the gunners of Smith’s Company being ordered to open fire on the Federal skirmishers in the woods. This was a process that would have to be repeated throughout the day. When the Federals would get too aggressive the guns would fire a few rounds of canister to drive them back further into the woods. They also periodically exchanged a few rounds with a Federal battery which was shelling up and down the Confederate line. (5) This Federal battery, while apparently unable to see the Confederate line, poured round after round into the batteries position.
Position of Gun number 3 Smith’s Battery
By 2 o’clock the fighting had spread along the line so that brisk skirmishing was going on in front of Ramseur’s Brigade as the Second Company of the Richmond Howitzers watched. To the right where there were no Confederate skirmishers to endanger the Third Company opened fire for a short period. (6) After firing some fifty or sixty rounds the Howitzers “ceased fire” hoping the enemy would do so as well. What the Confederates did not realize was that the increased Federal pressure was designed to drive them out of the woods in Doles front. This was necessary to allow a assault force to assemble within striking distance of the Confederate lines. By about 4 o’clock the Federal skirmishers had gained the upper hand . The Confederates whose line had been barely inside the wood line in the morning were driven completely back out of the woods and into the works by early afternoon. When this fact was reported to Gen. Ewell he recognized the threat this meant to his line and ordered Rodes to have his picket line reestablished at all cost.
Around 4 o’clock Maj. Hardaway was at Gen. Johnson’s position supervising the withdrawal of Capt. Dance’s battery. His battery was removed from the line and replaced by Millredge’s battery of Nelson’s Battalion. It was at this time that Mott’s Division of the Federal Second Corps made the first assault against the “Mule Shoe”. This attack was scheduled to be part of a major assault against the line held by the Confederate Second Corps. In addition to Mott’s division a improvised force under the command of Col. Emory Upton was to assault the salient held by Dole’s Brigade of Rodes division. The plan was for a simultaneous attack by the two forces preceded by a brief but violent artillery bombardment. However almost from its inception the plan began to unravel. Poor staff work by the Federal commanders led to Mott being given multiple unrelated tasks to perform. Tasks that were hardly within the capabilities of his division however. Under strength to begin with, he was also tasked with being the connection between the main army and Burnside’s Ninth Corps. Then Upton was ordered to delay his attack until 6 o’clock. The order if it was sent was not received by Mott however. Right on time his men stepped off and advanced in the general direction of the Confederate lines. Passing the Landrum House his men made little headway against the combined artillery and musketry from the defenders. Seeing that they could not succeed and that the promised support on their right had not charged Mott’s men retreated into the woods behind the Landrum House. A retaliative quiet then resumed on that section of the battlefield.
Shortly before 6 o’clock the quiet was abruptly broken when three Federal batteries opened fire on the Confederate lines between the woods to Captain Smith’s left and the right of Rode’s Division. When the firing started Maj. Hardaway was on the battalions left with Jone’s Second Company of the Howitzers. Maj. Watson was with Capt. Smith’s Company. For ten minutes the Federals shelled up and down the line as vigorously as possible. Fortunately for the defenders most of the shells passed over the line doing little damage. However the trajectory of these shells meant that many of them landed on the slope of the hill on which the Harrison House was located. Gen. Robert E. Lee was evidently meeting with Gen. Ewell there at the time. Men in the line noticed him and focused their attention on him and his actions during the shelling. (7) One shell in particular attracted the mens attention. Crossing the line so close “that it appeared to leave a trail of dust”, it burst close enough to the individual they believed to be Gen. Lee to obscure him from sight. Despite this and several other near misses he calmly watched the Federals thru his binoculars as the shells continued to come in. During this time the Confederate artillery was ordered not to return the fire but to wait for the Federal infantry. With nothing else to do the defenders generally took a seat behind the works. The tired, or perhaps more resigned went to sleep or at least feigned to do so. Promptly at 6 o’clock they ceased fire and all became quiet. The defenders noting the time thought that perhaps the Federal gunners had stopped for their supper.
From Doles works to the right of the farm road the Federals guided on to the wood line. (note woodline is about 50 yards closer today)
It was only a few moments later when they were disabused of that hope. From out of the woods in front of the crest to the right burst a body of federal infantry. Several ranks deep they were obviously guiding on the farm road as they headed for the works only a couple of hundred yards away.
View from the modern wood line to the confederate position at Doles Salient.
Both Smith’s battery and from the left Jone’s company of the Richmond Howitzers enfiladed the right flank of the Federals. (8) The canister rounds swept through the Federal ranks but could not stop them from reaching the Confederate works. It wasn’t long before orders were issued for the guns to “Cease firing – our men are charging!” A long line of Confederates are seen to be rapidly advancing toward the Federal line. The artillerymen jumped up on the works to cheer on the charge. Very quickly someone noticed that those men were not carrying weapons! The supposed charge was actually Confederate prisoners being herded back toward the Federal lines.
View from location of Smith’s right gun toward the area Upton’s men charged across.
Between the prisoners and the guns of Smith’s battery was a large body of Federal troops who have, after crossing the works turned to the right to expand the breech. These men who were rapidly advancing towards the guns but so far to the right that to fire on them would most likely kill as many Confederates as Federals. Still the guns were swung as fair as possible and a few rounds fired into the mass. This slowed their advance but the fire of these four guns was unable to stop the onrushing Federalists.
More dangerous was the fact that the Federals were now gaining the rear of the batteries position. Upton’s plan was that when the line was breached, some of his men would push on to the second line, while others swung right and left. These men would expand the width of the breach and secure the shoulders against a counterattack. The regiments which had swung to the right were driving the Confederate infantry back up the line past Smith’s guns. Others facing little resistance quickly moved past the rear of the battery position. As the infantry support was driven back one by one the guns of Smith’s Battery were in danger of being captured. And the rapid advance of the Federals behind them left the gunners with few options. With no way, or time, to withdraw the guns it was either fight or run. Like good soldiers the gunners obeyed orders and stuck to the guns. In succession first the caisson, then the limber chest and finally the guns of all but gun number four on the extreme left were taken by the Federals. Then the limber chest of that gun was taken as well. Seeing that the situation was hopeless Lieutenant Paine, in charge at the gun, asked the battalion executive officer, Maj. David Watson, “What must be done?” Maj. Watson gave no answer but his expression answered for him, the gun obviously could not be saved. Everyone who was able, officers and men alike, went across the works in front and ran down the line reentering it further down the works. Some went as far as the guns of Captain Jones Second Company. (9) Others joined various infantry units, while others didn’t attach themselves to any group.
Position of Gun number 4 Smith’s Battery
Some of the survivors from Smith’s battery joined the infantry of Daniel’s Brigade who were regrouping in the second line. Gen. Ewell ordered these men to counterattack the Federals and recover the guns. This, probably the first counterattack, managed to reach the abandoned caissons of the Howitzers. (10) The Federals inflicted such heavy casualties on this small force that they were quickly driven back.
As these men were reforming under Gen. Ewell’s urging a new brigade under Brig. Gen. Ramseur arrived on the scene from the left. Leaving their position to be covered by Battle’s Brigade extending its line, they quickly took up a line perpendicular to the works. Executing a quick left flank they, along with the survivors of the earlier charge, moved out toward the Federals. Braving the fire they advance until at twenty yards they came to a halt and the two lines blast away at each other. The numerical superiority of the Confederates began to tell and they surged forward and drove the Federals back from the first gun. But the Federals resisted ferociously and had to be driven from the guns one by one. (11) The Confederates had stopped the breakthrough and recaptured the guns but the Federals were far from defeated. They fell back a little more and took shelter behind the re-entrant line and resumed the struggle, bringing the Confederate counterattack to a halt. (12)
As Ramseur’s men had started the counterattack Maj. Hardaway ordered his Adjutant, Lt. Reid, to gather all the men from Smith’s Company he could and to follow him to the guns. As soon as one of the guns had been recaptured the Confederates attempted to put it back into action. The added firepower would be useful in helping to blast the Federals out of the line. But this was easier said then done. The implements to load and fire the guns could not be found, evidently taken with them by Smith’s men when they abandoned the guns. The few artillerymen, and this included both the battalion staff as well as some few men from the Second Howitzers, who returned to the guns had to be supplemented by infantrymen drafted to help. Despite the lack of implements the ad hoc crew of the fourth gun, including Maj. Hardaway as loader, and Lt. Reid as gunner was able to put the piece into action. Opening with canister on the determined Federals at virtually point-blank range. (13) After about seven rounds being fired the next couple of guns had been recaptured. Leaving Lt. Reid in charge of the Napoleon Maj. Hardaway went over to one of the 3 inch rifles. The other Napoleon was bypassed because it had so many bodies around it that it couldn’t be worked. Initially his crew consisted of three infantrymen that he persuaded to assist in working the piece. Working any of the guns was dangerous as anyone at the guns immediately became a target for the Federals. To make matters worse the range was extremely short. Not only were the Federals firing from behind the captured works but from some “pens put up by ambulance men about sixty yards to our right”. (14) For nearly an hour it seemed the two sides infantry plus the Howitzers guns blazed away at each other.
At some point as each side blazed away at each other, Col. Sandie Pendelton, Ewell’s Chief of Staff, brought one of the several reinforcing brigades up near the guns. Seeing his opportunity, Maj. Hardaway ran up to him and asked him to send up the first gunners he could find to help work the recaptured guns. Returning from his mission as guide, Pendelton went to Gen. Lee explaining the situation and also Hardaway’s urgent request for men. Lee turned to the nearest battery, Capt. Asher Garber’s Staunton Artillery for the needed men. (15) The General personally ordered Garber to leave his guns with his drivers and take the gun crews and report to Maj. Hardaway.
Even with the assistance of Garber’s men the fight around the guns was not easy. The Federals were only a short distance away and the disabling of the guns was a life and death priority for them. For the gunners the best defense was to keep the federals heads down with as rapid fire as possible. But this rapid-firing brought its own set of dangers. Not only dangerously heated up the guns but quickly exhausted the supply of ammo and friction primers. Several times the guns had to stop firing so that the men could go back to the caissons and retrieve more supplies. While necessary this exposed the men even more to the deadly musketry. So fierce was the Federal fire there was no thought of bringing the limber chests to the guns. To make matters worse a Federals had opened fire with a battery 600-800 yards to the front. Capt. Garber’s horse was killed by a cannon ball from this battery. Yet while dangerous it was not nearly as much so as the infantry fire.
And that Federal infantry fire was surely effective. Several of the men serving the rifle closest to the Federals were wounded at Maj. Hardaway’s side. By the end of the action Hardaway himself would have nine holes in his clothing and a smashed spy glass. Back at the one operable Napoleon Maj. David Watson along with some men from Jones battery had joined the scratch crew of officers and artillery men left there by Hardaway. But one well-aimed volley from the re-entrant put the gun temporarily out of action. Major Watson was mortally wounded as well as another artilleryman and an infantrymen helping shift the gun was killed. The survivors being too exhausted to continue the fight a litter was found and the Major taken from the field to the Corps hospital. He would die as a result of his wounds five days later. Men from Garber’s or other batteries would man the gun and continue the fight.
The re-entrant line as it looks today from just behind Smiths right hand gun position.
The Confederate continued pressure from the infantry was finally able to drive the Federals back enough to take possession of the re entrant. This success only made the artillery’s work more difficult. Because of a curve in the works they could still fire on the Federals still clinging to the works and traverses beyond. But to do so without hitting their own men required careful aiming. For the guns further to the left the problem was even more pronounced. Several times Maj. Hardaway had his hat blown from his head by the muzzle blast of the nearest gun behind him.
This would have been the view that the gunners at the guns behind Hardaway had of the Federal position.
While the battle had been raging on this shoulder of the breakthrough, that was not the only struggle. The Federal plan was that once a breach was made in the Confederate line, it would be immediately expanded. While a portion of the force drove straight ahead, others would swing to the left , still others to the right. Then being on the defenders flank, they could roll up the line on either side. The reserve force would be committed to that area where resistance was strongest. Following the plan three regiments had swung to the left and attacked up the line toward the “West Angle”. They were quickly able to rout the two left regiments of the Stonewall Brigade and drive them back as far as the high ground at the “West Angle”. But Johnson’s men had reacted quickly to the threat. The Stonewall Brigade had rallied and with the assistance from neighboring brigades had formed a line along the McCoul Lane. Reinforcements from Witcher’s and Steuarts Brigades along that line engaged in a furious firefight with neither side able to advance. Shortly afterwards R. D. Johnston’s Brigade of Gordon’s Division had attacked across the gorge of the breakthrough and driven the Federals back to the outside of the works. But there the Federals held. The Confederates despite the quick reaction in blunting then rolling back the charge could go no further.
On the Federal side things were looking grim. Despite the initial success Upton and his men could do no more than hang on. This would become more difficult the more power that the Confederates could bring to bear against his dwindling force. Finally realizing that he had committed all his men and that no reinforcements would be coming to his assistance Upton regretfully ordered his men withdrawn back to the wood line.
When the Federals grudgingly withdrew the Confederates, or at least some of them, caught up in the heat of the moment tried to follow-up on their success. Stephen Ramseur’s brigade certainly attempted to do so. In the eyes of some of the artillerymen who saw the action believed that his brigade behaved badly, but not just during the counterattack. Finally reaching the re-entrant they refused to advance further. When the Federals retired across the field to the wood line Ramseur ordered a charge, but none of his regiments moved. Ramseur hoping to inspire the men, leapt over the works, sword in hand, and called for his men to follow him. Again none responded and an embarrassed Ramseur returned to a position of more safety. (16) Little comment was made by those actively involved in this part of the action.
While the guns and most of the equipment of Smith’s battery was still serviceable the battery was certainly in no condition to stay in the line. Smith himself had been captured and about forty men had been lost. Since the position was obviously one requiring artillery support another unit was required.The decision was made to have Capt. Garber and his battery assume the position. So late that evening the exchange of units took place. The Howitzers guns were rolled by hand out of the pits back about 75 to 100 yards. There on the reverse slope they would be safe until they could be removed to camp. Garber’s guns were brought up from the position near the Harrison House and placed into the vacated pits. A guard of 4-5 men under a sergeant from Smith’s Battery was left with the guns to prevent any looting of equipment during the night. The surviving men and horses were allowed to return to the artillery camp where they could get some badly needed rest. (17)
The cost of this action has never been accurately determined. Gen Ewell estimated that his losses were about losses were less than 1000 men. Recent studies suggest that it was more on the order of 1300-1500. Casualties in the Third Company of the Richmond Howitzers were, 3 killed, 12 wounded, and 24 captured. In addition 25 horses were killed. (18) Federal losses were slightly less than the Confederates, perhaps about 1200.
In the early morning both Gen. Lee and Gen. Long visited the scene of the fight the previous evening. Capt. Garber was ordered to remove the Howitzers equipment and take it to the camp. But before they could reach camp they met the acting battery commander Lt. Henry Carter, with some of the battalion’s horses on a similar mission. He took charge of the equipment and the batteries survivor s and equipment was reunited. Later that morning the dead from the battery were buried in soldiers graves outside the camp.
Interestingly enough on May 12th, the guns of Garber’s Staunton Artillery played a pivotal role in the defense against Hancock’s breakthrough at the Mule Shoe. Still occupying the positions they had inherited from Smith’s battery, they were waiting, expecting to move with the rest of Cutshaw’s battalion, as support for Johnson’s Division. The expectation was that Grant’s army was going to move that night and the Confederates would try to interpose themselves in front of him. Col. Cutshaw had received permission from Gen. Edward Johnson to have the battalions horses and sick men sent back to camp that night for feeding and rest.
Unfortunately the horses had not returned when Hancock’ attack broke thru the defenses that morning. Robert Rodes personally ordered Capt. Garber to run his guns to the rear by hand. These guns went into position along the re-entrant line where they opened fire over Pegram’s brigade as it was moving back to the position from which it would launch its counterattack. The Louisiana Brigade formerly commanded by Harry Hayes withdrew from its position along Dole’s former line and joined the guns in stopping the Federals in their effort to roll up the Confederate line in that direction. These guns stayed in position all day firing on various Federal units and guns in front of the Bloody Angle.
In the small hours of the morning of the 13th, the Confederates abandoned the Mule Shoe line. The guns and infantry fell back to the new line in the rear which we today call the “Final Line”. With the exception of perhaps a few skirmishers, or sightseers Confederate troops would never again occupy those positions.
Time and the C(ivilian) C(onservation) C(orps) have changed the look of those positions in the 149 years since they meant life and death to hundreds of men. However if you look closely and follow the accounts of the men who fought over and behind them it is still possible to find where a fair amount of these events took place. Fortunate the re-entrant line and the positions of Capt. Ben. Smith’s Company of the Richmond Howitzers are a couple of those places.
(1) Creed T. Davis Diary, entry for May 10, W. S. White estimated in “A Diary of the War, a history of the Richmond Howitzer Battalion that the distance was 250 yards. That seems more reasonable.
(2) OR Series 1 Volume 46 pt1 Itinerary of Hardaway Light Artillery Battalion
(3) “A Diary of the War a History of the Richmond Howitzer Battalion”, page 243
(4) “A Diary of the War a History of the Richmond Howitzer Battalion “, page 243
(5) OR Series 1 Volume 46 pt1 Itinerary of Hardaway Light Artillery Battalion
(6) Creed T. Davis Diary, entry for May 10
(7) Charles M. Miller, letter of Feb 23, 1905, John Daniels Collection, UVA, Alderman Library.
(8) Creed T. Davis Diary, entry for May 11
(9) “A Diary of the War a History of the Richmond Howitzer Battalion”, page 245
(10) “A Diary of the War a History of the Richmond Howitzer Battalion”, page 245
(11) “A Diary of the War a History of the Richmond Howitzer Battalion”, page 245
(12) “A Diary of the War a History of the Richmond Howitzer Battalion”, page 245
(13) The Federals claim they couldn’t put the guns into service against their former owners because of a lack of implements. Since W. S. White claimed that some men from the Second Howitzers were at the gun he was initially at perhaps they brought implements. Major Hardaway evidently moved from gun to gun as they were recaptured. Major Watson was at the fourth gun when he was mortally wounded.
(14) Clipping from Virginia Newspaper Probably the Whig, in May 1864″ This article subtitle “Extracts from the Diary of an Officer of Gen. Lee’s Army” is certainly by either Maj. Hardaway or someone writing for him. Very detailed account of his involvement in the important events of May 10-1. His account of May 11th MAY give an entirely different reason for Hancock’s success. Today we can take this account and go almost certainly to each of the points he mentioned.
(15) Two batteries of Cutshaw’s Battalion, one under Capt. Asher Garber the other First Lieutenant Benjamin Maxwell, were posted across the gorge of the breakthrough. Evidently Garber was closest to Lee when Pendelton passed on Hardaway’s request.
(16) Creed T. Davis Diary, entry for May 11
(17) “A Diary of the War a History of the Richmond Howitzer Battalion”, page 249
(18) Richmond Examiner May 16, 1864.
The Mule Shoe, Facts and Myths 